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Abstract 
Although only about 50 years old, the software domain has already endured one well 
documented crisis, which was identified early in its evolution in the 1960s. Simply 
summarised, the initial software crisis – Software Crisis 1.0 as it is termed here – referred to 
the fact that software took longer to develop than estimated, cost more to develop than 
estimated, and did not work very well when eventually delivered. Over the years many 
studies have confirmed the Software Crisis 1.0. Nevertheless, software has been one of the 
key success stories of the past 50 years and has truly revolutionised modern life. However, 
over the past 50 years, there have also been enormous advances in hardware capability – 
dramatic reductions in hardware costs allied to dramatic increases in processing power and 
proliferation of devices; almost infinite amounts of data are now available through ubiquitous 
sensors and through applications such as Google. Complementing these ‘push’ factors, there 
is a significant ‘pull’ factor arising through the emergence of ‘digital native’ technology 
consumers who have never known life without technology. The opportunities for individuals, 
business and society afforded by the advances in hardware technology and the vast amounts 
of data potentially available, when allied to the insatiable appetite of digital natives, are truly 
enormous. Unfortunately there have not been similar advances in relation to our software 
development capability, and thus the critical limiting factor in realising the potential of the 
advances mentioned above is again software – the Software Crisis 2.0 as I label it here. 
Individual efforts are seeking to address this crisis – data analytics, parallel processing, new 
development methods, cloud services – but these are disjointed, and not likely to deliver the 
software development capacity needed. 
 
Software Crisis 1.0 
The term ‘software’ was coined in 1958 (Peterson 2000), but within ten years, problems in 
the development of software led to the coining of the phrase ‘software crisis’ (Naur and 
Randall 1968). The software crisis referred to the realisation that software took longer to 
develop than estimated, cost more to develop than estimated, and did not work very well 
when eventually delivered. Over the years, several studies have confirmed these tripartite 
aspects of the software crisis. For example, in relation to development time-scales: Flaatten et 
al. (1989) estimated development time for the average project to be about 18 months — a 
conservative figure perhaps given that other estimates put the figure at about three years 
(Business week 1988) or even up to five years (Taylor and Standish 1982). Also, an IBM 
study estimated that 68 per cent of projects overran schedules (Bowen 1994). In relation to 
cost, the IBM study suggested that development projects were as much as 65 per cent over 
budget (Bowen 1994), while a Price Waterhouse study in the UK in 1988 concluded that 
£500m was being lost per year through ineffective development. Furthermore, in relation to 
performance, the IBM study found that 88 per cent of systems had to be radically redesigned 
following implementation (Bowen 1994). Similarly, a UK study found that 75 per cent of 
systems delivered failed to meet users expectations. This has led to the coining of the term 
‘shelfware’ to refer to those systems which are delivered but never used. 
However, the initial software crisis has largely been resolved. While the Standish Chaos 
Report continues to paint a rather bleak picture of high rates of software project failure – 
estimated at 68%, for example (Standish Group 2009), the Chaos report findings and 
methodology have been challenged (e.g. Eveleens and Verhoef 2010, Glass, 2006). Although 
there has been no ‘silver bullet’ advance, using Brooks (1987) term, which affords an order 
of magnitude improvement in software development productivity, a myriad of advances have 
been made in more incremental ways, and software is now routinely developed largely on 
time, within budget, and works well. Software is really the success story of modern life. 
Everything we do, how we work, travel, communicate, entertain ourselves has been 
dramatically altered and enhanced by the capabilities provided by software. 
However, a new software crisis is now upon us, one which I term ‘Software Crisis 2.0’. 
Basically this arises as a result of the inability to produce software to leverage the absolutely 
staggering increase in the volume of data being generated, in turn allied to the enormous 
amount of computational power offered by the many hardware devices also available, and 
both complemented by the appetite of the newly emerged ‘digital native’ consumer (see Fig 
1). 
 
 
Fig 1 Software Crisis 2.0 
 
 
The Evolution of Hardware 
There are many eye-catching figures and statistics that illustrate the enormous advances in 
the evolution of hardware capacity over the past half-century or so. Moore’s Law, for 
example, predicted the doubling of hardware capacity roughly every 18 months or so. To put 
that in perspective, if one had invested just a single dollar when Moore was declaring his 
prediction initially, and if return on investment had kept pace accordingly, the individual’s 
net worth would be over a quadrillion dollars – that is over $1,000,000,000,000,000 or one 
million billion dollars. Moore’s law is paralleled by similar ‘laws’ in relation to storage 
capacity (Kryder’s Law) and network capacity (Butter’s Law) which portray similar 
exponential predictions.  
On each occasion when hardware appears to be halted due to an insurmountable challenge in 
the fundamental laws of physics – the impurity of atoms, sculpting light-wavelength limits, 
heat generation, radiation-induced forgetfulness, for example – new advances have emerged 
to overcome these problems as we move into the quantum computing area.    
Volume of Data 
While it is extremely difficult to quantify the increases in the volume of electronic data that 
potentially exists, there is undoubtedly a similar pattern of exponential increases paralleling 
that of the hardware arena. Eric Schmidt, CEO of Google, suggested in 2005 that the amount 
of data available electronically comprised 5 million terabytes (that is 5 million billion 
megabytes), of which only .004% was being indexed by Google (Schmidt 2005). He 
estimated the amount of data as doubling every five years.  
Dave Evans, Chief Futurist at Cisco Systems estimated in 2010 that there were about 35 
billion devices connected to the Internet, which is more than five times the population of the 
planet (Jeffries 2010). This figure is estimated to increase to 100 billion devices by 2020. 
This has given rise to the concept of the “Internet of Things” (IoT) (Ashton 2009). An 
exemplar project designed for the IoT is the  plan by HP as part of the Central Nervous 
System for the Planet (CeNSE) project to place a trillion ‘smart dust’ sensors all over the 
planet as a planet-wide sensing network infrastructure. These sensors can detect a wide 
variety of factors, including motion, vibrations, light, temperature, barometric pressure, 
airflow and humidity, and have obvious applications in transportation, health, energy 
management and building automation. 
To cope with this proliferation of devices, a migration is planned from the IPv4 protocol 
which has about four billion unique addresses to the IPv6 protocol which can support 21
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addresses – enough to uniquely address every grain of sand on every beach in the world. In 
this brave new world, the vast majority of communications will be machine-to-machine 
rather than machine-to-person, thereby generating an enormous amount of electronic 
information which is available for processing. 
 
The Emergence of ‘Digital Natives’ 
An interesting distinction has been drawn between ‘digital immigrants’ – those who began 
using digital technology at some stage during their adult lives, and ‘digital natives’ – those 
who have been immersed in the world of technology since birth and have as a consequence 
developed a natural fluency for technology (Prensky 2001).  By the age of 20, digital natives 
will have spent 20,000 hours online (Valkenburg and Peter 2008) and can cope with, and 
indeed even welcome, an abundance of information (Vodanovich et al 2010). This category 
of digital native consumer represents a significant ‘pull’ factor in seeking to take advantage 
of the opportunities afforded by advances in processing power and increased availability of 
data. 
A survey by the UN Body, International Telecommunications Union (ITU), reported that 
about a quarter of the world's 7 billion people use the Internet. Also, mobile phone 
subscriptions have been numbered at over four billion. There is not a simple equivalence of 
subscription to individual user – in Europe mobile subscription exceeds population by 11 per 
cent, whereas in Africa, mobile phones may be shared – but clearly this is a huge number of 
consumers. Also, the dramatic increase in mobile penetration suggests that consumers in the 
developing world are leap-frogging landline technology to the smart mobile devices. 
Seeking to extend the Internet of Things concept, Usman Haque proposes an “ecosystem of 
environments” though his Pachube project, a service that lets consumers tag and share real-
time sensor data from objects and environments globally. The success of user-led innovation, 
co-creation of value, and high profile crowdsourcing successes in solving complex R&D 
problems for NASA, Eli Lilly and Du Pont provides real testimony to the potential of the 
digital native 
 
Software Crisis 2.0 – the bottleneck 
Various initiatives have sought to address aspects of this problem. Early efforts in computer-
aided software engineering (CASE) sought to automate the software development activity, 
but this has not solved the problem. Similarly, early initiatives in software architectures, 
software patterns and software product lines sought to provide improvements by building on 
past learning. In the area of software process, maturity models and software development 
method–related initiatives such as method engineering have been the subject of research. In 
relation to leveraging hardware advances, there have been several initiatives in the area of 
multi-core processing and parallel computing. More recently, autonomous computing 
initiatives have sought to deliver self-maintaining systems which would evolve automatically. 
In relation to the so called ‘big data’, the field of data analytics is emerging. This builds on 
previous initiatives in artificial intelligence such as genetic algorithms. Efforts in relation to 
the semantic web and ontologies have also sought to address ‘big data’ challenges. The 
manner in which technology pervades all our lives has also given rise to complex challenges 
in the information security area. However this is just a brief snapshot of initiatives that seek 
to address the above challenges. The main point to note is that these initiatives are all 
fragmented and disjoint when viewed from the perspective of the software crisis 2.0. 
Given the scarcely comprehensible increases in hardware power and data capacity mentioned 
above, it is perhaps surprising that there has not been a ‘silver bullet’ to deliver even a modest 
one order of magnitude improvement in software productivity. Without wishing to deny the 
enormous advances that have been brought about by software, which has truly revolutionised 
life and society in the 20th and 21
st
 centuries, it is intriguing to imagine what life would be 
like if the software area had evolved at the same pace as that of hardware and data. But that 
has not been the case: Wirth’s Law (Wirth 1995) effectively summarises the comparative 
evolution in the software domain, namely that software is getting slower more rapidly than 
hardware becomes faster.  
Given the advances outlined above, we have entered an era when the limits of our 
imagination should be the only limiting factor in taking advantage of the advances outlined 
above to help solve intractable problems and deliver in areas such health care, energy 
efficiency, climate control, entertainment and the like. The first step in solving a problem is 
to acknowledge its actual existence. This article may seem controversial, but it seeks to 
accomplish the easy first part. The much more complex subsequent steps require the 
identification of an agenda to resolve the problem. 
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